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Extreme Pornography and Obscenity Legislation
Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (CJIA), a piece of UK
legislation that came into effect in 2009, seeks to criminalize the possession of extreme
pornography with a particular focus on controlling the spread of such images available
via the internet. The law mandates that an image is pornographic “if it is of such a nature
that it must reasonably assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the
purpose of sexual arousal.” An image is considered extreme if it is “grossly offensive,
disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character” and “if it portrays, in an explicit and
realistic way, any of the following:
a. An act which threatens a person’s life,
b. An act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person’s anus,
breasts or genitals.
c. An act which involves sexual interference with a human corpse, or
d. A person performing an act of intercourse or oral sex with an animal (whether
dead or alive),
and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal
was real” (CJIA). In this paper, I first consider the government’s given definition of
“extreme” pornography while evaluating the law’s purpose and likely effects. I argue that
the distinction between normal and extreme pornography diminishes the law’s physical
and symbolic efficacy.
First, it is informative to examine the legal evolution of the specific usage of
“extreme” adopted throughout the development of this law and to understand how each
transformation of “extreme” corresponds with the law’s purpose and likely effects.
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Initially introduced in 2005 following the sexual murder of Jane Longhurst1, the CJIA has
four stated aims. First, to “break the demand/supply cycle [of extreme pornography]. The
second goal is “to discourage interest in this material which we consider may encourage
or reinforce interest in violence and aberrant sexual activity” (Goggins 1). Next, the
government further based the proposal on the “desire to protect” society and those
involved in the creation of “sexual material containing violence, cruelty, or degradation,
who may be the victim of crime in the making of the material (2). The final goal is to
“send a clear message” that extreme pornography has no place in British society (i).
Several of these goals take a surprisingly feminist approach and indeed, the
proposal was supported by a number of feminist groups, including Rights of Women,
Justice for Women, the Women’s National Commission, Object, and Eaves (McGlynn,
Marginalizing 196). By criminalizing the possession of extreme pornography, this
legislation shifts the focus of the debate from the supply side to the demand side. Rather
than targeting the participants in (a category which includes many trafficked and nonconsenting women) or creators of extreme pornography, the proposal seems to recognize
that it is mainly men’s demand for such material that drives its production. Furthermore,
the bill strategically acknowledges that there may be a connection between viewing
extreme pornography and violence against women (the “against women” part is not
explicitly stated, but it is implied elsewhere throughout the bill). Finally, and importantly,
these goals, if met, would presumably have both a practical and symbolic effect. Not only
would the law deter consumers from purchasing or otherwise possessing extreme
pornography (thereby reducing demand, which would, in turn, decrease the supply), it
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would also successfully “send a message” that violence in pornography is criminal.
While the language and stated aims of the proposal are perhaps more compromising and
anemic than a radical feminist would prefer, the fulfillment of these goals would actually
represent a fairly huge feminist victory.2 Unfortunately, had it gone into effect, the
original proposal’s definition of “extreme” would have limited the law’s ability to fulfill
its purpose.
The proposal originally defined extreme3 as acts of “serious sexual violence and
serious violence in a sexual context,” the measure of which is grievous bodily harm
(Goggins 2). Qualifying “serious violence” in terms of bodily harm paradoxically both
limits and improves the law’s ability to accomplish its goals. To explain how this
threshold of bodily harm is inhibiting, we must first examine some of the common
patterns in contemporary pornography and pornography consumption.
Bridges suggests that images “initially evoking strong emotional responses, such
as gory or fearful pictures, lose their shock value over time and with repeated exposure.
This process is called habituation” (37). Interviewees featured in the documentary Inside
Deep Throat testify to the fact that mainstream pornography in the early 70s did not
feature what is commonplace now, namely anal sex, double penetration, and deep
throating. Yet after Deep Throat made over 600 million dollars and became one of the
highest grossing films of all time, the act of deep throating became a staple of mainstream
pornography, demonstrating the power of habituation. When “pornography becomes
2
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repetitive and uninteresting . . . [it] needs an edge. Pornography has to draw on some
emotion, hence the cruelty” (Jensen 4.3).4 Content analysis of popular, mainstream
pornography corroborates this analysis. In 2007, Wosnitzer and Bridges surveyed 50
titles selected from thirty different lists of the best-selling and best-renting videos
published by Adult Video News from 2004 until 2005. They found physical aggression to
be present in 88 per cent of the scenes and verbal aggression in 48 per cent. Moreover, 94
per cent of all acts of aggression were directed towards women, with men perpetrating 70
per cent of the aggressive acts (Bridges 46). It is obvious from these statistics that
“extreme” pornography is increasingly “normal” pornography. Possibly even more
disheartening, this process of habituation is only exacerbated by the Internet. The Internet
itself “transforms our concepts of sexually explicit and obscene material. . . .Our concepts
of obscenity are altered by the Internet’s ability to present us with a vast array of ideas”
(Winston 197). Yet even with this violence inundating mainstream pornography, most
consumers maintain that they are unaroused by violence and aggression. Bridges explains
this discrepancy: “ . . . if pornographic films showed the natural consequences of violence
and aggression, these consequences would decrease or eliminate arousal altogether for
most pornography consumers, something the producers and marketers of pornography
clearly would not want.” Therefore, pornography directors require that “characters
demonstrate indifference to or erotic pleasure from aggression” (36). And indeed,
Wosnitzer and Bridges found that 95 per cent of the targets of aggression responded
either neutrally or with expressions of pleasure (encouragement, sexual moans, etc.).
4

Jensen includes quotes from several pornography directors: “. . .fans want to see so much more extreme
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So how does this analysis of contemporary mainstream pornography correspond
with grievous bodily harm as a measure of serious violence? First, the qualification of
grievous bodily harm, in some respects, improves the law’s ability to accomplish its goals
in that it provides a clearer definition of violence. Violence is a word and concept with a
number of different meanings. It can have a different meaning in a sexual context versus
a non-sexual context, it can change depending on the perpetrator of the violence (selfdirected violence, for instance), and it can be used more theoretically, as Dworkin argues
that pornography “creates systemic harm to women. . . . because it is the subordination of
women perfectly achieved” (262). Limiting the definition to include only grievous bodily
harm prevents the defense from using, say, one of Derrida’s more abstract notions of
violence5 which would function to confuse the audience and arguably not have anything
to do with the violence of pornography.
On the other hand, if the actors in pornography appear to be indifferent to or even
enjoying the violence (and we know from Bridges that 95 per cent of the actors will be
depicted as such), viewers, judges, and juries are unlikely to buy the argument that the
violence will result in grievous bodily harm. In fact, a defense attorney will argue the
opposite – that even if the body is harmed, all participants still achieve orgasm, and the
physical sensation of pleasure outweighs any pain that was required to consummate
satisfaction. Additionally, members of Backlash, a BDSM organization formed in
opposition to this legislation, would likely testify to this argument. Consequently, it is
improbable that any trial or appeal would be prosecuted with grievous bodily harm as the
measure of serious violence, thereby reducing the law’s capability to fulfill its purpose.
5
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The use of the criteria of bodily harm also restricts the law from prosecuting rape
pornography unless it is of a particularly violent nature. The consultation paper refers to
the need to proscribe “extreme pornography featuring violent rape,” creating what
McGlynn calls a “dubious distinction between ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’ rape” (again,
what is considered to be violence plays an important role) (Goggins 1; Marginalizing
192). By permitting the possession of non-violent rape, the bodily harm requirement
restricts the bill’s ability to fulfill the goal of protecting both society and those involved
in the creation of such material. Murray notes that “such content can be extremely
damaging to someone at an impressionable point of sexual and emotional maturity” (88).
Moreover, restricting sexual violence to mean only bodily harm diminishes the
legislation’s symbolic potential. If the bill were to define extreme only as acts of “serious
sexual violence and serious violence in a sexual context” without the threshold of
grievous bodily harm, the ambiguity of violence would encourage most people to
interpret violence using the more widely understood conception of the word – namely,
something like hurt, abuse, or force. Incidentally, this is a conception of violence that is
used outside of a sexual context. Sexual violence means something more to a feminist6,
but for the average person (I’m not trying to sound elitist, rather merely placing myself
within a certain category of understanding), it makes little sense to make a distinction
between sexual versus non-sexual violence. Violence should be prohibited equally in
both contexts, arguably more so in a sexual context. But with the average person
understanding violence from this more standard perspective, a law restricting violence in
pornography would symbolize and actualize the government’s disapproval of violence
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against women. Narrowing violence to mean capable of causing serious bodily harm
sends the message that any other type of violence is acceptable, thereby diminishing the
law’s symbolic potential.
Even as feminists organizations considered this original proposal to be weak and
compromising, other groups found the proposal’s language and suggestions to be
inflammatory. McGlynn identifies the two key players in the war over censorship: the
moral fundamentalists and the liberal fundamentalists. Mostly political (as opposed to
academic), the moral fundamentalists view all pornography as a serious problem because
it encourages “a distorted and selfish view of sexuality which divorces sex from love and
tenderness” (McGlynn, Pragmatism 329). Others make clear the political motivation in
combating the spread of pornography as Amitai Etzioni fears “increasing moral
confusion and social anarchy” in society. Liberal fundamentalists, on the other hand,
consider liberty to be the prime value, and “justice consists in permitting each person to
live as he or she pleases, free from the interference of others” (Shaw 95). Adhering to a
strict interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s so-called ‘Harm Principle,’ liberal
fundamentalists argue that, “in the absence of clear evidence of physical, or perhaps even
mental, harm, legislative regulation of individual behavior is unwarranted” (McGlynn,
Pragmatism 335).7 In the case of pornography regulation, liberal rhetoric of a right to
freedom of expression and a right to privacy are the most common proclamations against
censorship. After much debate and revision of the original proposal to meet the demands
of both the moral and liberal fundamentalists, the definition of extreme was left with a
more narrow scope than ever. Restricted now only to acts which “threaten a person’s life”
7
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and/or “results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person’s anus, breasts or
genitals,” it is more unlikely than ever that this law will fulfill its purpose or have any
meaningful effects (CJIA).
Not only will this law have little to any effect, it has also created a dangerous
distinction between “extreme” and “non-extreme” pornography, adding legitimacy to all
“non-extreme” pornography.8 This is particularly disturbing to radical feminists,
including myself, who know that the harm of pornography is more than just the physical
harm to body parts, but also manifests itself in psychological harm, in the sexualization of
women enjoying violence, and in the overall objectification of women. “Pornography is
violence against women, violence which pervades and distorts every aspect of our
culture” (McGlynn quoting Dworkin, Pragmatism 347).
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